OPINION- Atiku Abubakar’s Elusive Presidency: Three Missed Opportunities in Nigeria’s Political Chessboard

As a businessman, former Vice President, and serial presidential candidate, his political journey is a masterclass in resilience, strategy, and, at times, miscalculation. Despite his extensive experience and national prominence, the presidency has remained tantalizingly out of reach. This special report examines three pivotal moments where Atiku’s decisions—or indecision—cost him Nigeria’s highest office. These moments, rooted in complex political maneuvering, reveal the intricate dynamics of power, loyalty, and regional balancing in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. For stakeholders in Nigeria’s political and economic spheres, understanding these missed opportunities offers critical insights into the nation’s governance and the forces shaping its future.

In 1999, Atiku Abubakar emerged as a key player in Nigeria’s return to democracy. Having won the governorship of Adamawa State, he was selected as the running mate to Olusegun Obasanjo, a former military head of state and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate. Their ticket won, ushering in the Fourth Republic, with Atiku serving as Vice President from 1999 to 2007. As Obasanjo’s deputy, Atiku wielded significant influence, overseeing economic reforms and privatizations that earned him both praise and criticism. However, tensions simmered beneath the surface, particularly as Obasanjo’s second term approached.

By 2003, Atiku’s presidential ambitions were evident. As a northerner with a strong political base, he was well-positioned to succeed Obasanjo, a southerner, in line with Nigeria’s unwritten rotational presidency agreement. Yet, Obasanjo sought to extend his tenure, reportedly pleading with Atiku to support his re-election bid. According to political insiders, Obasanjo’s appeal was both personal and strategic, leveraging their shared history and the need for PDP unity. Atiku acquiesced, choosing loyalty over ambition, and campaigned for Obasanjo’s second term.

This decision proved costly. Obasanjo’s re-election in 2003 delayed Atiku’s presidential aspirations, and their relationship deteriorated sharply during the second term. Obasanjo accused Atiku of disloyalty and corruption, notably alleging he misappropriated $145 million from the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF). Atiku denied the charges, claiming the funds were invested to accrue interest, but the damage was done. By 2006, Atiku’s fallout with Obasanjo led him to defect to the Action Congress (AC), where he ran for president in 2007. He placed third, behind PDP’s Umaru Yar’Adua and ANPP’s Muhammadu Buhari, a result many attribute to his fractured relationship with Obasanjo and the PDP machinery.

Analysis: Atiku’s decision to support Obasanjo’s second term was a calculated risk that backfired. By prioritizing party unity and personal loyalty, he underestimated Obasanjo’s determination to marginalize him. The move delayed his presidential bid and eroded his standing within the PDP, forcing him to seek an alternative platform with limited national reach. For stakeholders, this episode underscores the delicate balance between loyalty and ambition in Nigerian politics. Atiku’s deference to Obasanjo, while strategic in the short term, cost him a clear path to the presidency and set a precedent for future missteps.

Atiku’s political influence extended beyond the federal level, notably in Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial hub. In the early 2000s, Lagos was a battleground between the PDP and the Alliance for Democracy (AD), a regional party dominant in the southwest. Bola Tinubu, then Lagos State Governor and an AD stalwart, faced intense pressure from the PDP-controlled federal government, led by Obasanjo and Atiku. The 2003 gubernatorial election saw Funsho Williams, the PDP candidate, challenge Tinubu’s re-election. Despite allegations of electoral irregularities, Tinubu retained the governorship, a victory that solidified his status as a political godfather.

Atiku played a pivotal role in this outcome, though not as a direct antagonist. As Vice President and a key PDP figure, Atiku had the clout to push for a more aggressive strategy to unseat Tinubu, including leveraging federal resources or legal challenges. Instead, he reportedly advocated for a conciliatory approach, allowing Tinubu to consolidate power in Lagos to pacify the AD and maintain political stability in the southwest. This decision was driven by Atiku’s broader strategy to build alliances across regions, particularly with influential figures like Tinubu, whom he later courted for a joint presidential ticket in 2007.

However, this choice had long-term consequences. By allowing Tinubu to entrench his political machine in Lagos, Atiku inadvertently empowered a future rival. Tinubu’s control over Lagos gave him the resources and influence to co-found the All-Progressives Congress (APC) in 2013, which became a formidable force. In 2023, Tinubu defeated Atiku in the presidential election, polling 8.8 million votes to Atiku’s 6.9 million. Tinubu’s victory was bolstered by his southwest base, a foundation Atiku could have weakened two decades earlier.

Analysis: Atiku’s decision to prioritize regional harmony over political conquest in Lagos reflects his pragmatic approach to coalition-building. However, it underestimated Tinubu’s ambition and capacity to transform Lagos into a springboard for national power. For stakeholders, this moment highlights the importance of foresight in political strategy. By allowing Tinubu to retain Lagos, Atiku preserved short-term alliances but sowed the seeds for a rival’s ascendancy, culminating in his own defeat in 2023.

Atiku’s third missed opportunity came in the lead-up to the 2015 presidential election. After losing the PDP presidential primaries to Goodluck Jonathan in 2011, Atiku returned to the PDP fold but grew increasingly disillusioned with the party’s direction. Jonathan, a southerner from the South-South, faced mounting criticism for his handling of insecurity, corruption, and economic challenges. By 2014, Atiku defected to the newly formed APC, seeking to challenge Jonathan in the primaries. He lost to Muhammadu Buhari, who went on to defeat Jonathan in 2015, ending the PDP’s 16-year rule.

Atiku’s decision to abandon Jonathan was a gamble that did not pay off. Had he remained in the PDP and supported Jonathan’s re-election, he could have positioned himself as a unifying figure within the party. With Buhari, a northerner, completing his second term in 2023, the presidency was expected to rotate back to the north, giving Atiku a strong claim as the PDP’s flagbearer. Instead, his defection to the APC alienated PDP loyalists and weakened his national appeal. When he returned to the PDP in 2017 and ran in 2019, he lost to Buhari again. By 2023, the PDP’s internal divisions and the emergence of Peter Obi’s Labour Party further fragmented the opposition, handing Tinubu the presidency.

Analysis: Atiku’s failure to support Jonathan in 2015 was driven by his frustration with the PDP and his belief that the APC offered a faster route to the presidency. However, this move ignored the long-term benefits of party loyalty and regional balancing. By defecting, Atiku burned bridges within the PDP and misjudged Buhari’s dominance. For stakeholders, this episode illustrates the risks of short-term opportunism in a political system where patience and coalition-building are often rewarded. Had Atiku negotiated a path to the PDP ticket post-Jonathan, he might have capitalized on northern sentiment in 2023.

Atiku Abubakar’s three missed opportunities reveal systemic truths about Nigerian politics. First, the rotational presidency, while unwritten, is a powerful force shaping political calculations. Atiku’s deference to Obasanjo in 2003 and his failure to align with Jonathan in 2015 disrupted his ability to leverage this principle. Second, regional power bases, like Tinubu’s Lagos, are critical to national success. Atiku’s conciliatory approach in 2003 allowed a rival to grow, underscoring the need for strategic ruthlessness. Finally, party loyalty and coalition-building are double-edged swords. Atiku’s frequent defections—PDP to AC, PDP to APC, and back—projected ambition but eroded trust among party faithful.

For stakeholders, Atiku’s journey offers lessons in navigating Nigeria’s complex political landscape. His resilience is admirable, but his missteps highlight the importance of timing, loyalty, and foresight. As Nigeria grapples with economic stagnation, insecurity, and regional tensions, the next generation of leaders must learn from Atiku’s near-misses to build coalitions that transcend personal ambition.

Atiku Abubakar’s pursuit of the presidency is a saga of ambition, strategy, and missed opportunities. By yielding to Obasanjo’s plea for a second term, he delayed his own ascent and fractured his political base. By allowing Tinubu to retain Lagos, he empowered a rival who would later outmaneuver him. By failing to support Jonathan in 2015, he forfeited a chance to position himself as the north’s natural successor. Each decision, while rational in its context, carried long-term costs that culminated in his 2023 defeat.

As Atiku reflects on his career, his story remains a cautionary tale for Nigeria’s political class. For stakeholders—business leaders, policymakers, and civil society—these moments underscore the need for strategic patience, coalition-building, and an acute understanding of Nigeria’s regional and ethnic dynamics. Atiku’s legacy is not one of failure but of persistence in a system where power is both elusive and unforgiving. Whether he makes another run or retires from the race, his journey will shape Nigeria’s political discourse for years to come.